> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.tuple.app/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Broadcasting app metadata If you've [enabled the setting](/application-preferences/macos-preferences-screen-share#broadcast-app-metadata), Tuple will broadcast the window title and content URL of whatever app you have focused while you're sharing your screen. Participants who are [capturing the call](/pairing-with-tuple/capturing-calls) keep that metadata alongside the recording, so they end up with a history of the files and URLs you looked at. This also gives connected agents a quick way to understand what's on screen. ## Turning it on and off The setting is **Broadcast app metadata**, in [Screen share preferences](/application-preferences/macos-preferences-screen-share#broadcast-app-metadata). Tuple asks whether you want it on the first time you share your screen. This setting governs what leaves *your* machine; other participants control for themselves whether they want to capture this information or not. ## When metadata gets sent Tuple samples the focused window once a second, and broadcasts what it finds only after the same content survives two consecutive samples. A window you flick past is never sent, and content that stays put is normally sent one to two seconds after it appears. A separate 60-second window keeps content that flips back and forth from being sent over and over. ## What gets broadcast Each broadcast describes the focused window: * **`app`**: the app the window belongs to, as `id` (the bundle id) and `name` (what you'd see in the Dock). * **`title`**: the window's title. * **`url`**: what the window is showing, as a scheme'd URL. `http(s)://` for a web page, `file://` for a document. * **`window_id`**: an identifier for the window itself. It's only meaningful within one sharer's stream, where it tells "moved to a different window" apart from "same window, the title changed". ```json theme={null} { "app": { "id": "com.google.Chrome", "name": "Google Chrome" }, "title": { "value": "PR #4212 · tupleapp/tuple" }, "url": { "value": "https://github.com/tupleapp/tuple/pull/4212" }, "window_id": 41235 } ``` `title` and `url` are objects rather than bare strings, because each one carries whether Tuple modified it before sending: | Shape | Meaning | | ----------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `{"value": "…"}` | Broadcast exactly as captured. | | `{"value": "…", "redacted": true}` | Something was removed from inside the value. | | `{"redacted": true}` | The value was dropped entirely, as with a sign-in URL. This is distinct from the field being absent, which means there was nothing to send in the first place. | | `{"value": "…", "truncated": true}` | A title past 256 characters, clamped and ending in `…`. | ### Veiled apps Apps hidden by [App Veil](/application-preferences/macos-preferences-app-veil) broadcast no **metadata at all**. A veiled app sends `{"veiled": true}` and nothing else. ### URL sanitization For an `http(s)` URL, Tuple drops the value entirely, broadcasts a scrubbed version, or broadcasts it unchanged. The value is **dropped entirely** — participants see that a URL was there and was redacted, with no value — when: * The host is a known identity provider, or a subdomain of one: Google Accounts, Microsoft login, Apple ID, Auth0, Okta, OneLogin, Ping, Duo, Atlassian ID, AWS sign-in and Cognito, Salesforce login, or Yahoo login. Matching respects domain boundaries, so `tuple.okta.com` matches `okta.com` but `notokta.com` doesn't. * The path contains an auth-related segment: variants of `login`, `signin`, `signup`, `register`, `oauth`, `auth`, `authorize`, `callback`, `sso`, `saml`, `verify`, `magic-link`, `reset-password`, `invite`, `activate`, `confirm`, `otp`, `2fa`, `mfa`, or `token`. Whole segments only, so `/auth/` matches and `/author/` doesn't. * The query or a parameter-shaped fragment carries `response_type`, `client_id`, and `redirect_uri` together, which is the signature of an OAuth authorization request. * The URL can't be parsed or safely re-serialized. Every other `http(s)` URL is **broadcast with credentials removed**: * Inline credentials get removed, as in `https://user:password@example.com/`. * Credential-shaped query parameters and fragment parameters go: OAuth codes and tokens, `state`, `nonce`, OTPs, tickets, SAML assertions, session IDs, signatures, API keys, passwords, JWT and auth fields, and S3 or GCS signed-URL credentials. * A signed S3 or GCS URL keeps its object path and its harmless metadata (algorithm, date, expiry) while losing the credential, session token, and signature. A URL that trips none of these rules is broadcast with its scheme, host, port, path, query, and fragment intact. Unrelated parameters stay, such as YouTube's `v` or `tab=overview`, and so do non-parameter fragments such as Gmail's `#inbox/`. Non-`http(s)` URLs, `file://` among them, aren't scrubbed. ### Window title sanitization Titles get a similar treatment: * `KEY=value` and `KEY: value` assignments whose key names a credential — `PGPASSWORD`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` — keep the key and replace the value with `•••`. * `Bearer ` headers and `scheme://user:password@host` connection strings are replaced the same way. * Tokens recognized by their shape alone are replaced whole: GitHub, GitLab, Slack, AWS, Stripe, npm, OpenAI, and Anthropic key prefixes, plus JWTs. * Titles longer than 256 characters are truncated, with a trailing `…` marking the cut. Scrubbing is a curated set of heuristics, not a complete authentication detector. A secret can still get through: in an ordinary-looking path, under a parameter name Tuple doesn't recognize, on a company identity provider with an unfamiliar domain and path, or in a non-`http(s)` URL. For windows that should never be shared at all, use [App Veil](/application-preferences/macos-preferences-app-veil).